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Abstract—As the first interplanetary mission managed by the 
NASA Goddard Space Flight Center, the Mars Atmosphere 
and Volatile EvolutioN (MAVEN) had three IT security goals 
for its ground system:  COMPLIANCE, (IT) RISK 
REDUCTION, and COST REDUCTION.  In a multi-
organizational environment in which government, industry 
and academia work together in support of the ground system 
and mission operations, information security governance, risk 
management, and compliance (GRC) becomes a challenge as 
each component of the ground system has and follows its own 
set of IT security requirements.  These requirements are not 
necessarily the same or even similar to each other’s, making 
the auditing of the ground system security a challenging feat.  
A combination of standards-based information security 
management based on the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST) Risk Management Framework (RMF), due 
diligence by the Mission’s leadership, and effective 
collaboration among all elements of the ground system enabled 
MAVEN to successfully meet NASA’s requirements for IT 
security, and therefore meet Federal Information Security 
Management Act (FISMA) mandate on the Agency.  
Throughout the implementation of GRC on MAVEN during 
the early stages of the mission development, the Project faced 
many challenges some of which have been identified in this 
paper.  The purpose of this paper is to document these 
challenges, and provide a brief analysis of the lessons MAVEN 
learned.  The historical information documented herein,
derived from an internal pre-launch lessons learned analysis, 
can be used by current and future missions and organizations 
implementing and auditing GRC.
Keywords—IT security, information security, information 
security management, cyber security, FISMA, risk, risk 
management, compliance, regulations, governance, GRC
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1. INTRODUCTION
One of the main drivers for deploying Information 
Technology (IT) products and services within an 
organization is to automate business processes.  Whether 
information technology is used to process and store vast 
amounts of data, to facilitate the exchange of information 
internally and externally, or to contribute to one’s 
knowledge, IT enables the business.  Ground systems rely 
on information systems to support mission operations.  
Mission Operation Centers (MOCs) and Mission Support 
Areas (MSAs) are equipped with systems (hardware and 
software) and networks that assist in spacecraft command 
and control; data processing and storage; science and 
engineering data analysis; etc.  Regardless of the cost of the 
mission, these information systems must provide assurance 
that the confidentiality, integrity and availability of the 
mission’s information are protected.  Governing laws and 
regulations exist to ensure this protection is applied to 
federal information systems such as those supporting NASA 
missions.  NASA’s Mars Atmosphere and Volatile 
EvolutioN (MAVEN) mission successfully met information 
system security mandates, although not without 
encountering certain challenges along the way.  Some of 
these challenges along with identified root causes, potential 
impact if not addressed, and resulting mitigating strategies 
are documented in this paper.  The intent is to share some of 
the lessons learned from this compliance-seeking journey 
with individuals and organizations responsible for 
implementing similar or identical GRC strategies.  While 
each mission/organization is unique, some of the challenges 
they face are commonplace, especially as budgets are 
trimmed down, and how information technology (IT) and 
information security (IS) are, unfortunately, often seen as 
both expensive and expendable.  By considering some of the 
lessons from MAVEN’s implementation and auditing of 
information security governance, risk management, and 
compliance, individuals and organizations in like 
environments could potentially prevent similar barriers 
towards meeting their GRC goals.
2. FEDERAL INFORMATION SYSTEM SECURITY 
MANAGEMENT AND SUPPORT
Every U.S. federal government agency, whether civilian or 
military, is required to meet the minimum information 
security requirements established by the Office of 
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20140013251 2019-08-31T17:35:08+00:00Z
2Management and Budget (OMB) in Circular A-130, 
Appendix III, Security of Federal Automated Information 
Resources [1].  Agencies like NASA are required by the 
Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) to 
effectively manage IT security risks following guidelines set 
by the National Institute of Standards and Technology 
(NIST).  While the model for managing risks is deemed by 
many to be outdated and ineffective, it is still the current 
federal government methodology for securing and managing 
the security of its information systems1
NASA information systems – including mission operations 
and contractor-operated systems – must be protected to 
ensure the confidentiality, integrity and availability of data 
and resources.  By implementing and auditing governance, 
risk management, and compliance (GRC) on MAVEN’s 
ground systems, the Project ensured that the above 
requirement for protecting NASA information systems is 
met. NIST defines governance as “the set of responsibilities 
and practices exercised by those responsible for an 
organization (e.g., the board of directors and executive 
management in a corporation, the head of a federal agency) 
with the express goal of:  (i) providing strategic direction; 
(ii) ensuring that the organizational mission and business 
objectives are achieved; (iii) ascertaining that risks are 
managed appropriately; and (iv) verifying that the 
organization’s resources are used responsibly. [3]”
Information security governance, specifically, is defined as 
“the process of establishing and maintaining a framework 
and supporting management structure and processes to 
provide assurance that information security strategies are 
aligned with and support business objectives, are consistent 
with applicable laws and regulations through adherence to 
policies and internal controls, and provide alignment of 
responsibility, all in an effort to manage risk. [4]” This risk 
pertains to information security risks due to 
vulnerability/exposures in IT systems (hardware and 
software) with the potential to incur risks to other areas such 
as project schedule and cost.  Risk management, on the 
other hand, is “a comprehensive process that requires 
organizations to:  (i) frame risk (i.e., establish the context 
for risk-based decisions); (ii) assess risk; (iii) respond to risk 
once determined; and (iv) monitor risk on an ongoing basis 
using effective organizational communications and a 
feedback loop for continuous improvement in the risk-
related activities of organizations.[5]”  The Merriam-
Webster dictionary defines compliance as “conformity in 
fulfilling official requirements. [6]” MAVEN’s official 
.  The basis of this 
methodology is the NIST Risk Management Framework 
(RMF) [2] designed to help federal agencies and 
organizations implement a security program focusing on 
technical, operational and management security controls.  
Together, these controls form layers of security protecting 
the information system.
1 At the time of writing of this paper.
requirement for IT security was simple:  To meet NASA’s 
requirements for IT security.  The verification of this level 3 
requirement was based on a successful Assessment and 
Authorization (A&A)2
This paper covers mission ground systems supporting 
mission operations.  Administrative and development 
systems, Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition 
(SCADA) systems, infrastructure elements, and non-
mission information systems are outside of the scope of the 
Mission’s IT security efforts, and therefore outside of the 
scope of this paper.  The terms Information Security (IS) 
and Information Technology (IT) Security are used 
interchangeably throughout this paper.
of the ground system. 
The information specific to MAVEN presented here has 
been reviewed and approved for public release by the 
MAVEN Information System Owner (ISO) and Information 
System Security Official (ISSO).  Finally, there is no 
Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI), no Sensitive 
But Unclassified (SBU) information, no export controlled 
information per the International Traffic in Arms 
Regulations (ITAR), or any information in this paper that 
could potentially put the Mission at risk.  
3. MISSION OVERVIEW
The Mars Atmosphere and Volatile EvolutioN (MAVEN) 
mission is the first interplanetary mission managed by 
NASA’s Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC)3, home of 
the “largest organization4 of scientists and engineers 
dedicated to learning and sharing their knowledge of Earth, 
the Sun, the solar systems, and the universe. [7]” Goddard is 
also providing two of the science instruments onboard the 
Lockheed Martin-built spacecraft.  “MAVEN will be the 
first spacecraft mission dedicated to exploring the upper 
atmosphere of Mars.  [It] will study the nature of the red 
planet’s upper atmosphere, how solar activity contributes to 
atmospheric loss, and the role that escape of gas from the 
atmosphere to space has played through time.”  This Mars 
Scout Program mission is led by Principal Investigator (PI) 
Dr. Bruce Jakosky from the University of Colorado which,
in addition to building some of the instruments, is 
responsible for the science operations as well as for the 
education and public outreach (EPO).  Management of the 
program is performed by the Jet Propulsion Laboratory5
2 NASA’s equivalent to the FISMA Certification and Accreditation (C&A) 
process.
which also provides data relay communications, navigation 
support, and Deep Space Network operations.  [8] The 
3 Under the Planetary Science Projects Division (Code 430) of the Flight 
Projects Directorate (Code 400).
4 In the United States.
5 Under the Mars Exploration Program.
3University of California at Berkeley (UCB) will provide 
management for the Particles and Fields (P&F) Package, 
and will provide various instruments and components.
IT Security Management and Support Approach
The management and support of MAVEN information 
security was a joint collaboration between the Project 
Information System Owner (ISO) and the Project 
Information System Security Official (ISSO), assisted by IT 
security support personnel.  The Mission Operations and 
Ground System Manager took on and held the role and 
responsibilities of the ISO, while the ISSO role and 
responsibility was taken and held by a GSFC Flight Projects 
Directorate (FPD) IT/IS Manager whose primary 
responsibility was to advise the ISO on all matters related to 
IT security.  In addition to the ISO, ISSO and IT security 
support teams, the following actors were also identified:  
FPD Subordinate System Officials (IT Manager, FPD ISSO, 
FPD IT security support personnel), Authorizing Official 
(AO), Center (GSFC) Chief Information Security Officer 
(CISO), among other officials.
Once the IT security leadership was established, three IT 
security goals were defined for the MAVEN project as 
identified in table 1: COMPLIANCE, (IT) RISK 
REDUCTION, and COST REDUCTION.
Table 1 MAVEN Goals for IT Security
C
O
M
PL
IA
N
C
E  Support the planning and implementation of the NIST Risk Management Framework (RMF) (per NIST Special 
Publication (SP) 800-37), and assessing the implementation of the NIST SP 800-53 security controls.
 Document existing compliance status, and where each element is in the security life cycle (system 
categorization – security control selection – control implementation – control assessment – authorization –
monitoring).
 Track compliance and non-compliance. 
(I
T)
 R
IS
K
 
R
E
D
U
C
T
IO
N  Establish communication channel(s) between MAVEN Project Management Office (PMO) (via the ISSO) and 
the sites/facilities (IT security points of contact (POCs)).
 Compile and analyze MAVEN project IT security status reports including security metrics.
 Continuously monitor risks to the ground system.
C
O
ST
 
R
E
D
U
C
T
IO
N  Create an IT Security Working Group comprising of IT security representatives from and knowledgeable about 
each MAVEN ground system element who can be Goddard MAVEN PMO points of contact for faster 
knowledge sharing & incident response.
 Use NASA-adopted standards and NASA-approved templates instead of developing new ones from the ground 
up.
MAVEN’s level 3 requirement for data security stated that 
the “MOS/GDS6
6 Mission Operations System/Ground Data System.
shall ensure the security of its data 
management system per NASA security document (NPR 
2810.1, latest revision).”  NASA Procedural Requirement 
(NPR) 2810.1, Security of Information Technology, is 
NASA’s implementation of the NIST RMF, and contains 
references to individual, theme-specific IT security 
handbooks (ITS-HBKs) containing NASA-defined values to 
guide in the implementation of the security controls per 
NIST SP 800-53, Recommended Security Controls for 
Federal Information Systems and Organizations.  The 
following approach for meeting this requirement was 
established for the ground system (covering all of its 
elements):
 Determine NPR 2810.1A & NIST SP 800-53 
compliance across all elements.
 Identify and document existing security control 
implementation.
 Establish and maintain security baselines.
4 Develop and track Plan of Actions and Milestones 
(POA&Ms) for mitigating or accepting risks.
In addition to the above goals, level 3 requirement, and 
approach, MAVEN set itself the following objective:  To 
attain an Authorization To Operate (ATO) from NASA by 
at least 6 months prior to launch.7
For each of the identified ground system element, an IT 
security point of contact (POC) was designated to 
participate in and support the MAVEN IT Security Working 
Group (ITSWG).  The ITSWG, in collaboration with the 
Network Connectivity Working Group (NCWG), identified 
ground system boundaries based on networks,
interconnections, jurisdictions, and other considerations.  
Knowing the boundaries of the system was one of the first 
steps in the inventorying of information pertaining to IT 
security processes (e.g., security assessments), procedures 
(e.g., incident response, contingency planning), and 
products (e.g., system security plans (SSPs)).
The bulk of the initial IT security work focused on such 
inventorying. Every ground system element had to be 
covered by a security plan. MAVEN IT Security took into 
account existing signed and current ATOs and SSPs from 
the various ground system elements.  Based on existing 
documentation, and through ITSWG bi-weekly meetings, 
interviews, and other means of communication, specific 
security control implementation was inventoried.  The 
objective of this initial gathering of security control 
implementation information, based on NIST SP 800-53 
security controls, was to re-define requirements, if needed, 
after performing gap and risk analysis over the 
implementation by each element.  Partial or non-
implementation of security controls may constitute an 
increase of risk to the overall ground system.  The gap and 
risk analysis of the collected information was an important 
step in identifying deviations from the Agency requirements 
documented in NPR 2810.1A.  From this analysis, a risk 
rating of low, moderate or high risk was obtained according 
to impact (to the element/ground system) vs. the likelihood
of the risk.
4. CHALLENGES, ROOT CAUSES &
CONSEQUENCES, RESOLUTIONS, OPPORTUNITIES 
FOR IMPROVEMENT
Late Start
One of the most important IT security lessons that the 
Project learned regarding the implementation and auditing 
7 Launch window for MAVEN:  November 18, 2013 until December 7, 
2013.
of GRC on MAVEN pertains to requirements.  The project 
instituted its IT security requirements following its 
Preliminary Design Review (PDR), and as such, put the IT 
security management and support (ITSM&S) work one 
major project milestone behind.  Between PDR (NOV 2010) 
and the critical design Engineering Peer Review (EPR) 
(SEP 2011), the Project defined a level 3 (L3) requirement 
for IT security; developed an approach for managing and 
supporting IT security based on NPR 2810.1A; and began 
executing its IT security management plan for the ground 
system.  
Whether a Project starts late, on-time, or has a head-start in 
its security work, the GRC implementation and auditing 
methodology can greatly influence the outcome of the 
security work.  Another important factor that can contribute 
to a successful GRC implementation is having the right 
management and support personnel to champion and carry 
on the IT security work.  MAVEN’s System Owner had a 
gradual, cumulative knowledge of GRC from a previous and 
related role in support of another federal government
organization.  IT security-knowledgeable MAVEN project 
managers were also involved in and supportive of the GRC 
implementation work.
Using a divide-and-conquer approach, the Project 
established an IT Security Working Group (ITSWG) 
comprised of IT security representatives from each element 
of the ground system working together with the MAVEN 
Information System Security Official (ISSO) and 
Information System Security Engineer (ISSE) on GRC 
activities.  Championed by the MAVEN Information 
System Owner (ISO), the collaborative work by the ITSWG 
resulted in a clearer understanding of the ground system
boundary; in the identification of system security plans, and 
in knowledge regarding the implementation of security 
controls across the ground system.  
Although this approach – coupled with experienced 
ITSM&S personnel – promoted an accelerated schedule of 
IT security activities, the Project still received a Request For 
Action (RFA) at its Critical Design Review (JAN 2012) as a 
consequence of being one major project milestone behind.   
The RFA was successfully closed, and all IT security 
activities fully caught up with planned schedule by the 
Project’s Mission Operations Review (MOR) (NOV 2012).
In theory, IT security considerations should be given 
throughout the mission phases with special emphasis on the 
initial design and development phases.  The earlier the 
considerations are given, the higher the probability of a 
successful security control implementation.  
5Multi-Organizational Architecture in Heterogeneous 
Environment
MAVEN, like most NASA missions, taps the knowledge 
and expertise of not only its government civil servants and 
support contractors, but also of its industry and academia 
partners who play key roles in mission and science 
operations.  While this “inter-industry” collaboration is 
welcomed, encouraged and beneficial to all, each “industry” 
has and follows its own set of security requirements; has 
different levels of risk tolerance; and – as a result – exerts 
disparate, culturally-driven IT security practices.  Because 
of the heterogeneous nature of the overall project 
organization, this disparity posed challenges to the 
implementation and auditing of security controls across the 
ground system.
Even within a particular “industry” such as the federal 
government, there are many departmental silos with their 
own set of requirements (standards, processes, etc.) that may 
not fit in another department’s security practices.  In the 
case of NASA, as an agency, a superset of IT security 
requirements exist, but meeting such requirements by its 
field centers, by the directorates (divisions) within the 
centers, and by the projects within the directorates can differ 
substantially.  Also, NASA’s procedural requirements for 
information security are only applicable to contractors and 
external entities to the extent of what is established within 
their respective contracts.  
Early in the initial/development phase of the MAVEN 
ground system, the assumption was that all security 
boundaries would abide to this Agency superset of 
information security requirements; however, that was not 
the case.  On the MAVEN ground system, each component 
(or element) fell under either GSFC, JPL8 or other 
institutional IT security purview.  While logistically this 
organization helped the (project) management of specific 
ground system components, the distinct security baselines 
applied to each security boundary required additional risk 
reviews to ensure that the standards and processes 
implemented in one jurisdiction did not open up new risks 
on another jurisdiction.  That was the case of the MAVEN 
MSA9 being under the purview of JPL IT Security while the 
MAVEN Backup MSA (bMSA)10
8 Jet Propulsion Laboratory in Pasadena, CA, operated by CalTech.
was under GSFC’s 
responsibility.  Both had distinct IT security requirements to 
meet, but both required similar configuration settings due to 
their relationship with one another (the bMSA is the MSA’s 
alternate command and monitoring site during the critical 
Mars Orbit Insertion (MOI) event).  While the bMSA 
information systems met NASA’s requirements, it was 
9 Located at the Lockheed Martin facility in Littleton, CO.
10 Located at Goddard Space Flight Center in Greenbelt, MD.
unknown whether the MSA did.  The MSA is a critical 
component of the ground system:  It is responsible for 
MAVEN’s mission operations; thus, the MAVEN ISO 
commissioned an internal risk assessment of the MSA by 
the Mission’s internal IT security team to verify that 
appropriate security controls were in place to protect 
MAVEN’s command and control (C&C) center.  In addition 
to the extra risk assessment to ensure the security
implementation would satisfy the minimum requirements 
or, if not, if risks could be accepted, agreements between 
two security boundary officials were documented in the 
form of an Interconnection Security Agreement (ISA) which 
outlined how each boundary protected Mission data both 
locally and cross boundaries.  ISAs were developed for all 
external security boundaries exchanging Mission data with 
internal NASA systems.
Even though security requirements differed across the 
ground system, the MAVEN project managed its overall IT 
risks by identifying them, and taking actions to ensure that 
the ground system is protected regardless of which security 
standard and requirement were being followed by a 
particular ground system element.  The focus was on the 
criticality of the component with regard to its role within the 
ground system, as well as on securing loose ends (the 
weakest links).  
Current and newer missions should decide whether or not to 
require all of its components including external entities to 
follow the Agency’s superset requirements.  The pros and 
cons of such directive is outside of the scope of this paper, 
but should the mission decide to enforce, for instance, the 
Agency’s requirements and implementation methodology, 
the decision must be authoritative across the entire ground 
system.  Projects should also engage their Contracting 
Officers (COs) to validate applicability of IT security 
requirements against all contracts11.
Institutional Culture Clash
An experienced workforce is one of the greatest assets of a 
mission. Most NASA missions utilize support personnel 
who have worked together on previous projects, and so it is 
not uncommon to find people or teams collaborating on 
multiple missions, past and present.  This “re-use” of 
personnel allows for continued team dynamics, but at the 
same time contributes to the perpetuation of a set of cultural 
baggage carried on by each team.  While this baggage can 
bring positive results to the project, it can also impact the 
understanding and adaptability to project-wide 
requirements, especially new or even slightly distinct 
11 For instance, enforcing IT security requirements as defined by Federal 
Acquisition Regulation (FAR) clause 1852.204-76.
6requirements pertaining to information security that perhaps 
have not been addressed before by the teams.  
On MAVEN, this culture clash was visible between GSFC-
managed elements and JPL-managed elements.  Multiple 
standards, conventions, processes, etc. can be a challenge, 
specifically to auditors who must understand both sets of 
requirements to figure out if residual risks exist on either 
jurisdictions.  MAVEN handled this issue by finding a 
common ground between system boundaries managed by 
different organizations.  For instance, while JPL does not 
follow NASA’s implementation of FISMA (through NPR 
2810.1A), it has in fact adopted the NIST Risk Management 
Framework (RMF) which NPR 2810.1A is based on.  
An element cannot impose changes to or deviations from 
existing information security policies and procedures of 
another element, but the Mission can establish a project-
wide information security “standard,” “convention,” etc. 
that is applicable to most and preferably all elements.  The 
challenge is obtaining buy-in from all stakeholders to ensure 
that any project-wide directive is applicable to most if not 
all elements, and that it is flexible enough to be molded or 
adapted by each element.  Very rarely does a one-size-fits-
all approach succeed in standardizing security 
implementation practices, and projects must take into 
consideration that change often brings resistance from 
stakeholders.  Being aware of possible culture clash between 
stakeholders, carefully managing stakeholder expectations, 
and early conflict identification and resolution are advised.
A culture clash should not be confused with a stakeholder 
agenda.  ISOs must be aware, understand, accept and 
exercise his/her roles and responsibilities per NASA policy 
in order to ensure that this clash of cultures does not 
negatively impact the (IT security) work of the mission.  
ISOs must be empowered to make preemptive risk 
mitigation/acceptance decisions on behalf of the 
Authorizing Official (AO) in order to reduce risks.12
12 Note:  AOs will ultimately make the decision for the organization.
The 
MAVEN ISO and the MAVEN project leadership in general 
focused on managing (IT) risks to the overall ground system 
rather than on the different elements forming the ground 
system.  It is true that such cultural differences can 
negatively impact the (IT security) work if unacceptable 
behavior from any party leads to additional risks, especially 
those related to the non-compliance of information security 
regulations.  Failure to comply with such regulations can 
result in risks not only to the project but also to other 
projects as well as to the entire Agency depending on what 
is being protected.  In the end, it is the AO who is ultimately 
responsible for the risks of the project, but the ISO must be 
proactive in ensuring that the ground system (IT) risks are 
documented and tracked, mitigated or accepted (by the 
Authorizing Official), and partially mitigated with 
compensating controls whenever feasible if the risks cannot 
be mitigated.
Applicability of IT Security Requirements
Knowing to whom the information security requirements are 
applicable is as important as defining the actual 
requirements themselves. Overall, information security 
requirements define how information and information 
technology resources must be protected.  If a given 
requirement is not applicable to a ground system element, 
for instance, then how are resources protected within that
element? The security posture of the mission cannot be 
assessed if the security posture of one or more component is
unknown.  If the requirement for information security on 
one or more component is non-existent, then the security 
implementation cannot be audited because if there is no 
requirement, there is no compliance “obligation” on the part 
of the component. The System Owner must ensure that 
whichever requirement is applicable to this element, that the 
requirement is defined and meets or exceeds the Project’s 
overall requirement.  If the requirement is unknown to the 
project leadership, then a closer look at how the element has 
met the requirement(s) can enable the project to analyze the 
risk level at the element.  
The Goddard MAVEN PMO had no initial visibility into the 
documented JPL IT security requirements covering the 
MSA and other components. The previously mentioned 
internal security assessment of the MSA element provided 
the MAVEN PMO with the necessary visibility to the 
security posture of the JPL-managed component.  From this 
point on, the Project engaged in the risk management 
process for documenting, mitigating and tracking risks at the 
MSA.
Although JPL IT security requirements were not disclosed 
to the MAVEN PMO prior to MAVEN’s internal security 
assessment of the MSA, it is important to note that the JPL 
IT security team collaborated with the MAVEN IT security 
team, and provided excellent support before, during and 
after the internal security assessment of the MSA.  There 
was one work product in particular that greatly helped with
the analysis of the JPL security control implementation:  An 
internal JPL document mapping the JPL security control 
implementation to the NIST security controls as 
documented in NIST SP 800-53 [9].  This delta document 
helped translate JPL’s security control implementation into 
a workable checklist that could be used against NASA’s 
implementation of the NIST security controls.  This 
reference document provided by JPL facilitated the 
translation of the requirements by looking at the actual 
implementation details rather than at the requirement itself.
The use of standards can be a common denominator when 
different requirements are in place.
7Systems Engineering Approach vs. IT Security Management 
Approach
The management of federal information system security is 
based on a specific risk management approach.  This
approach is similar to risk management processes in systems 
engineering & project management, but it is not the same.  
The unfamiliarity of federal information security 
management processes by certain stakeholders including 
decision makers across the ground system became a 
challenge not only to the implementation aspect of GRC, 
but also to GRC auditing.  Similar to the institutional culture 
clash, each group brings their knowledge and experience to 
the project.  Because of the risk management similarities 
between system engineering/project management and “the 
FISMA way” of conducting risk management, some of the 
expectations were obfuscated, especially with regard to 
requirements verification.
The six phases or steps of the NIST Risk Management
Framework security life cycle are shown in Figure 1:
Figure 1 NIST RMF Security Life Cycle [10]
The numbers under each step title (e.g., FIPS 199 / SP 800-
60) correspond to the applicable NIST guidance publication.
The publications are available for download from the
Computer Security Resource Center of the NIST Computer 
Security Division.13
13 http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/
8Figure 2 depicts the same phases or steps in terms of 
processes with inputs and outputs.  This alternate 
representation of the RMF provides another view of the 
security life cycle that could facilitate its understanding 
from an engineering perspective. With the exception of the 
first and last steps, the output of one process is the input of 
the next process.  This means that each step depends on the 
successful completion of the previous step.
For MAVEN, because most of its ground system elements 
had already selected and implemented security controls 
(steps 2 and 3), the Project performed a security 
categorization (step 1) as part of its requirements definition,
and then focused on steps 4 (security control assessment) 
and 5 (information system authorization) to verify that the 
requirements were being satisfied. If a gap analysis showed 
the need for implementing additional controls and/or control 
enhancements, then steps 2 (selection of security controls) 
and 3 (implementation of security controls) were repeated.
The above risk management process focuses on selecting 
the appropriate level of protection as required by the 
information system.  The monitoring part (step 6), which is 
and should be continuous, is where there is closer 
resemblance with the standard project risk management 
process in which the risk is identified, analyzed and 
controlled.
Figure 2 Inputs and Outputs to the NIST RMF Processes
9The auditing work performed on MAVEN was based on the 
NIST Risk Management Framework which is security 
control-based.  The technical, operational and management 
security controls are audited (verified) through security 
assessments.  This auditing is not a one-time event; the 
verification of the security control implementation (and
operation) must be performed frequently. Continuous 
Monitoring is an important security process per FISMA; it 
is almost like an on-going requirement verification in 
systems engineering terms.  Like safety, ground system 
security is more of a process or service than a product.  
Security products help automate some of the security 
processes, but no product can ensure security without 
appropriate processes in place.  Information assurance is 
like mission/safety assurance:  It requires constant 
monitoring and frequent inspections, especially with the 
ever evolving threat landscape that can pose risks to the 
Mission’s information systems.
Even with a well-defined requirement and a good 
requirement verification plan, if there is a lack of 
understanding of the requirement by stakeholders, IT 
security teams may experience resistance to support IT 
security activities by stakeholders. Therefore, it is 
important to make sure everyone involved understands what 
the project is expected to comply with, knowing that such 
understanding is subject to interpretation by stakeholders 
who will see things from different angles, and respond 
according to their view of security. One of the first steps is 
acknowledging that the IT security management work will 
follow its own risk management methodology, different 
than systems engineering’s, for instance.
Heritage Mentality
In product development, having heritage parts/components 
can be very beneficial, especially if they have been 
successfully deployed on a previous project/mission.  In 
information technology and information security; however,
the term “heritage” is not always good; it can imply 
obsolescence.  Having heritage teams with knowledge and 
experience from serving previous missions is excellent 
provided these teams keep up with current requirements,
especially with IT security requirements.
“We’ve always done it this way.”
“We’ve never had to do it before.”
“If it ain’t broke, don’t fix it.”
These were some of the stakeholder affirmations that were 
heard during the planning and development stages of the 
mission with regard to certain IT security activities.  The 
resistance to change is expected, but such resistance must be 
dealt with early in the project’s initial stages using change 
management techniques including outreach and security 
briefings.
The requirements for IT security change over time.  FISMA 
was signed in 2002, but it was revamped in 2010.  NASA 
provided guidance for implementing the 2010 version of 
FISMA in 2011.  As part of the FISMA requirements, plans 
and procedures are reviewed annually, and some of the 
reviewed plans and procedures may contain modifications,
such as those based on updated organizationally defined 
values (ODVs) that dictate how a given security control is 
implemented. Like technology management, information 
security management must keep up with the evolving threats 
to ensure data and resources are protected against them.
Misconception:  IT Security Activities Cease After ORR
Upon successful Operational Readiness Review (ORR), 
MAVEN established and enforced a configuration freeze on 
both the MSA and the backup MSA.  This meant that no 
changes to systems were to be made until launch.  These 
changes included but were not limited to changes to security 
configuration due to software patching.  Other recurring IT 
security activities such as system monitoring, risk analysis 
and reporting, etc. were planned and still expected to be 
performed.  There was apparent confusion by certain 
stakeholders regarding the continuation of the security work 
after the ORR, and one component of the ground system 
reallocated (human) resources that were originally 
supporting the IT security work to other activities based on 
an assumption that its IT security commitment ended at 
ORR.
Like insurance, information security tasks are often seen as 
costly and expendable but only until an incident occurs.  
The cost of security incident breaches and clean-up is high, 
and preventive IT security work must continue throughout
the mission life.  It does not end after a major project 
milestone and/or after launch, except of course when the 
Project reaches its final milestone:  Completion/termination.
In the case of MAVEN, after the ground system is 
developed, tested, verified and placed into operations 
(launch and post-launch), the total number of development 
Full Time Employees (FTEs) decrease but the security 
processes that have been implemented will continue to be 
executed throughout the life of the Mission.  The monitoring 
of network traffic, system usage, resource access attempts, 
hardware and software maintenance, and other activities 
must continue.  Special attention should be paid to system 
vulnerabilities due to obsolete software.  The patching of
vulnerable software, and the verification that no 
unacceptable vulnerability exists via credentialed 
vulnerability scanning are some of the expected tasks to 
reduce system vulnerabilities, and ultimately maintain or 
increase the security of the mission’s information systems.
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ISOs must ensure that GRC-related activities continue to be 
performed according to the organization’s requirements.  
NASA’s implementation of a more continuous monitoring-
centric approach to security assessment will reduce much of 
the overhead caused by the documentation-heavy, security 
snapshot approach that current missions undergo.
Nonetheless, risk management decisions will continue to be 
documented, and risk decision makers will continue to be 
held accountable for their actions (or lack thereof).  
Stakeholders, in general, are also accountable for security, 
and they are reminded each year by IT security awareness 
training programs.
5. CONCLUSION
MAVEN is an exciting mission that will enable us to better 
understand the Red Planet’s atmosphere, and obtain answers 
to questions that previous Mars missions did not or could 
not answer.  The engineering is amazing, and the science 
work promising, but all the systems engineering and 
scientific investigations depend on the security of the 
information systems supporting the ground system and 
mission operations to ensure that, for instance, mission 
operations have control of the spacecraft, scientific results 
are trusted and not skewed (i.e., does not lack integrity), and 
that the Mission in general is not compromised due to a 
security breach of the ground system.  While the IT security 
component is miniscule compared to other aspects of the 
Mission, it plays an important role in information assurance 
much like safety and mission assurance plays a key role in 
protecting the Mission.
The MAVEN IT Security team was not directly responsible 
for the implementation of the security controls across the 
ground system, but it assisted the different elements of the 
ground system ensure that controls were in place; risks were 
identified and acted upon; and that the Mission complied 
with NASA’s requirements for IT security.  Like laws, IT 
security policies and requirements exist for protection.  
Projects rely on information technology to conduct business.  
Information systems enable the ground system to operate 
the mission, and their confidentiality, availability and 
integrity must be protected.
There is no one-size-fits-all solution for such protection.  
There is no silver bullet, no technology capable of 
eliminating IT security risks.  That is why risks must be 
managed so that as vulnerabilities are reduced, the security 
of the ground system is increased.  Information assurance is 
as important as mission assurance, and project leadership is 
expected to use due diligence in managing IT risks. The 
championing of the Mission IT security work for MAVEN 
evolved over time just like the Mission’s GRC work 
evolved from a no requirement for IT security at PDR to a 
fully FISMA compliant ground system at ORR. The road to 
MAVEN IT security compliance was not a straight, leveled 
line; it was rough and at times required the Project to pave 
the path that had not been cleared before.  
The lessons learned captured in this document are just a 
concise summary of some of the IT security challenges that 
the Project faced and dealt with. This paper does not brag 
about the successes of MAVEN’s GRC implementation; to 
the contrary, it shows how the planning and implementation 
of GRC were imperfect, and highlights some of the mistakes 
made during the process.  MAVEN leadership could simply 
keep this information internal, without disseminating it to 
the public; instead, the lessons learned by the Project are 
being shared to the aerospace community so that current and 
future missions can take these lessons in consideration as 
they plan and implement GRC.  Each mission/organization 
is unique, and special considerations must be taken by 
projects if following the recommendations herein.  While 
the approach for implementing and auditing GRC will differ 
from mission to mission, projects/organizations may likely 
experience similar challenges faced by MAVEN and other 
NASA missions.
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Table 2 Lessons Learned Recapitulation
MAVEN is an exciting mission that will enable us to better understand the Red Planet’s atmosphere, and obtain 
answers to questions that previous Mars missions did not or could not answer.
Lesson #1: START EARLY.
Lesson #2:  FIND COMMON (IT SECURITY) DENOMINATOR IN A DIVERSE ENVIRONMENT.
Lesson #3: RESPECT CULTURAL/INSTITUTIONAL DIFFERENCES, BUT DON’T LET THEM NEGATIVELY 
INTERFERE WITH THE GRC WORK.
Lesson #4:  CLEARLY DEFINE IT SECURITY REQUIREMENTS SCOPE.
Lesson #5:  FOLLOW APPROPRIATE GRC IMPLEMENTATION METHODOLOGY.
Lesson #6:  HERITAGE CAN BE GOOD AND
Lesson #7:  ASSURE CONTINUOUS MONITORING.
BAD.
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